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NOTES
"BUT I WAS ONLY FOLLOWING ORDERS":
THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL TORT LITIGATION
The government contractor defense is a federal common law
defense that immunizes an independent contractor in the govern-
ment's employ from strict liability in tort at the state level.
Federal courts have recognized some form of the government
contractor defense for over forty years.' In the past, courts
applied this defense only in public works and military products
liability settings.2 Cases in these settings prompted several cir-
cuits to formulate individual versions of the defense with differing
supportive analyses.3 In 1988, in Boyle v. United Technologies
1. The Supreme Court first used a form of the government contractor defense in
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940). Although the Court based
the defense on common law agency principles, the recognition of the government con-
tractor defense in this case led to the creation of modern formulations of the defense.
See Case Comment, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: The Turning Point for the
Government Contractor Defense?, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 935, 939 (1988).
2. See, e.g., Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 22-23 (contractor performing engineering services for
government classified as government's agent and therefore not liable for property damage
caused by dikes and artificial erosion of river banks); Beaver Valley Power Co. v. National
Eng'g & Contracting Co., 883 F.2d 1210, 1213, 1219 (3d Cir. 1989) (contractor hired by
state department of transportation who built bridge that raised the level of the river
and flooded power company's station not liable because of government contractor defense);
Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 404, 409 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233
(1988) (government contractor shielded from liability when panel on airplane came off in
midflight and caused airplane to crash, killing pilot); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556,
558 (5th Cir. 1985) (government contractor defense shielded manufacturer of gun turret
from liability after freely rotating turret gun injured soldier during military vehicle's fall
from a bridge).
3. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have expressed the two primary formulations of
the government contractor defense. See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d
736, 745-46 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). These two
approaches acted as a basis for formulation of the defense in other circuits. See, e.g.,
Beaver Valley Power Co., 883 F.2d at 1214-17 (in the Third Circuit); Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 487 U.S. 500 (1988); Tozer, 792
F.2d 403 (in the Fourth Circuit); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 354-55 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985); Bynum, 770 F.2d at 567 (in the Fifth Circuit);
Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 656 F. Supp. 984, 990 (D. Md. 1987), affd, 874 F.2d
946 (4th Cir. 1989); Hendrix v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1551, 1555 (N.D.
Tex. 1986); Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 353-54 (D. Kan. 1983).
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Corp.,4 the United States Supreme Court resolved a split among
the circuits over the elements and application of the government
contractor defense in the military products liability setting.
In Boyle, the Supreme Court held that a government contractor
could benefit from the government's sovereign immunity if the
contractor could overcome certain threshold requirements and
meet the three elements of the defense. 5 The Court also recog-
nized that government contractors could use this defense in
settings other than those involving military procurement con-
tracts.6 The Court did not elaborate, however, on the specific
areas in which the defense would apply.
In 1989, citizens who lived or worked near a government-
owned, contractor-operated nuclear facility brought a state tort
action implicating the private government contractor for personal
and property damages caused by alleged negligent operation of
the facility.7 The government contractor attempted to bar state
tort liability by using the government contractor defense as
defined in Boyle. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio refused, however, to allow the government con-
tractor to resort to this defense. The court determined that the
contractor could not meet the threshold requirements of the
defense in a tort action because of its violation of the duty of
care that certain federal environmental statutes prescribe.8 Al-
though the district court disallowed the use of the government
contractor defense, it recognized that the defense would be valid
in other environmental tort litigation settings.9 Many commen-
tators also believe that the government contractor defense would
be valid in such settings given the proper circumstances. 10
4. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
5. Id. at 504, 512. For an extensive discussion of the threshold requirements and
elements of the defense as explained in Boyle, see infra notes 51-86 and accompanying
text.
6. 487 U.S. at 506 ("The federal interest justifying this holding surely exists as much
in procurement contracts as in performance contracts; we see no basis for a distinction.");
see also Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1990)
("The underlying premise in Boyle applies to all government contracts, and is not limited
to the military context.").
7. Crawford v. National Lead Co., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1048, 1053 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
8. Id. at 1053-55. Plaintiffs in Crawford based their tort actions on the violation of the
standards imposed by the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988), Standards for
Protection Against Radiation, 10 C.F.R. S 20 (1988), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion's ALARA ("as low as reasonably achievable") policy, 10 C.F.R. § 20.1 (1990). Crawford,
29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1054.
9. Crawford, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1053 n.7.
10. See, e.g., Frulla, Using the Government Contractor Defense in an Environmental
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This Note first briefly traces the history and policy behind the
government contractor defense. In determining whether a con-
tractor can use the defense in the environmental tort setting,
11
this Note next examines the defense as the Supreme Court
defined it in Boyle and reviews recent attempts to apply it in
the environmental tort setting. This Note also attempts to pin-
point and resolve the problems involved in using the defense in
the environmental tort litigation setting and to analogize the
policies supporting the Boyle defense to the environmental tort
setting. Finally, this Note discusses alternatives that may provide
the government contractor with different approaches to achieve
similar goals without facing the obstacles normally encountered
when trying to extend the government contractor defense to the
environmental tort setting.
HISTORY OF THE DEFENSE
Origins
The modern government contractor defense has its origins in
two common law defenses: (1) defenses arising under principles
of agency and (2) the contract specifications defense.12 Tradition-
ally, courts used principles of agency law to shield a contractor
from tort liability, allowing the contractor to share in the gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity by virtue of the agency relation-
ship.13
The Supreme Court used agency principles to create the first
form of the government contractor defense in Yearsley v. W.A.
Context, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 896 (1990); Hohenhaus, Purpose and Policy-Further
Development of the Federal Government Contractor's Defense Following Boyle v. United
Technologies Corporation 55-56 (Aug. 1990) (WESTLAW, TP database); Lee & Slaughter,
Government Contractors and Environmental Litigation, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2138, 2139
(Feb. 10, 1989); Willmore, High Court Holds Fire on Military Contractors; Boyle in Court:
Invitation for New Litigation Strategies, Legal Times, July 18, 1988, at 16, col. 3. But see
Stever, Perspectives on the Problem of Federal Facility Liability for Environmental
Contamination, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,114, 10,118-19 (1987).
11. For purposes of this Note, the "environmental" setting includes consideration of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act
(CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. S§ 7401-7642 (1988);
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k; and the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 9601-9675.
12. Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 353-54 (D. Kan. 1983).
13. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 22 (1940).
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Ross Construction Co.,14 a public works case.15 In Yearsley, the
government contractor built dikes in the Missouri River and
produced artificial erosion by means of large boats with paddles
and pumps. 16 A riparian landowner claimed that this artificial
erosion resulted in a taking without just compensation of ninety-
five acres of riverfront land.17 The Court held that the contractor
acted as an agent of the government and thus could share in the
government's cloak of sovereign immunity. 8 The contractor merely
needed to prove the agency relationship between itself and the
government. To secure this extension of the government's sov-
ereign immunity, 9 the contractual relationship between the gov-
ernment and its contractor easily satisfied this element.
The contract specifications defense is a common law defense
that protects contractors who reasonably follow the specifications
of a third party but produce a product that later proves to be
dangerous.20 The third party may be either the government or a
private party.2' The contract specifications defense is based on
the presumption that a contractor does not possess sufficient
knowledge and expertise to allow it to review and evaluate every
14. 309 U.S. 18.
15. Note, In Defense of the Government Contractor Defense, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 219, 229
(1986).
16. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 19.
17. Id. at 19-20.
18. Id. at 22 ("[T]here is no ground for holding [the government's] agent liable who is
simply acting under the authority thus validly conferred. The action of the agent is 'the
act of the government.' ").
19. Because the Federal Tort Claims Act did not exist at the time of Yearsley, the
government had almost absolute sovereign immlunity. In many situations today, however,
agency principles cannot serve as a basis for the government contractor defense because
Congress has waived or severely limited sovereign immunity in many settings. See 28
U.S.C. SS 2671-2680 (1988). This narrowed immunity defeats any arguments for extension
of sovereign immunity because the government has no immunity to extend.
20. Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Kan. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS S 404 comment a (1965)). The Restatement provides:
[O]ne who employs a contractor to make a chattel for him, like one who
employs a contractor to erect a structure on his premises . . . usually
provides not only plans but also specifications, which often state the material
which must be used. Indeed, chattels are often made by independent con-
tractors from materials furnished by their employers. In such a case, the
contractor is not required to sit in judgment on the plans and specifications
or the materials provided by his employer. The contractor is not subject to
liability if the specified design or material turns out to be insufficient to
make the chattel safe for use, unless it is so obviously bad that a competent
contractor would realize that there was a grave chance that his product
would be dangerously unsafe.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 404 comment a (1965).
21. Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 354.
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design it receives "and is thus not held to the same high standard
of care as is a designer."'
Although both agency principles and the contract specifications
defense provided a valid basis for contractor immunity in the
past, neither traditional defense survives as a viable defense for
the modern government contractor due to federal government
limitations and waivers of sovereign immunity.2
The Feres-Stencel Doctrine: Interpreting the Federal Tort
Claims Act
Government contractors first sought immunity through use of
a government contractor defense in public works settings.24 Due
to the increasing sophistication of military hardware, the govern-
ment contractor defense soon became necessary in products lia-
bility cases in which a product that the government ordered from
an independent contractor injured a member of the armed serv-
ices.z5 This need led to modern formulations of the government
contractor defense, the main purpose of which was to subtly
extend the federal government's sovereign immunity to contrac-
tors in its employ.
22. Id.; see also Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 46, 145 N.E. 321,
321-22 (1924) ("A builder or contractor is justified in relying upon the plans and specifi-
cations which he has contracted to follow, unless they are so apparently defective that
an ordinary builder of ordinary prudence would be put upon notice that the work was
dangerous and likely to cause injury.").
23. The Federal Tort Claims Act created these limitations. 28 U.S.C. 55 2671-2679
(1988).
24. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 19 (1940); see also Myers v.
United States, 323 F.2d 580, 581-83 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding contractor immune from
liability for damages resulting from construction of highway in accordance with govern-
ment specifications); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 826-27 (D.
Conn. 1965) (holding contractor immune from liability for damages resulting from dredging
river channel in accordance with government specifications).
25. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 502, 511-12 (1988) (copilot
drowned in helicopter crash in ocean because of alleged defect in escape hatch design);
Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1476, 1478 (5th Cir.) (divers killed in
vacuum created by improper design of diving chamber), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 327 (1989);
Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 404-07 (4th Cir. 1986) (pilot killed allegedly because
panel on plane came off in midflight, causing him to lose control of plane), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1233 (1988); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.
1985) (pilot killed when airplane crashed into sea, most probably due to faulty stabilizer
system), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 558 (5th
Cir. 1985) (serviceman injured by freely swinging turret gun when vehicle swerved off
bridge and plunged into creek); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 446, 448-49
(9th Cir. 1983) (pilot killed by impact against plane in emergency ejection during flight),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
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Sovereign immunity protects the government from suit unless
it has given its prior consent.m Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act2 (FTCA), Congress waived much of the federal government's
sovereign immunity, thereby subjecting the government in many
cases to tort liability in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances.8
In Feres v. United States,29 the Supreme Court applied the
newly enacted FTCA and held that the government was not
liable under the Act for injuries to servicemen when the injuries
arose out of or were in the course of activity incidental to military
service.30 The Court explained that the rationale underlying the
FTCA recognized a distinctively federal character in the rela-
tionship between the government and members of its armed
forces. Federal law rather than state tort law, therefore, should
control that relationship.31
Feres prohibited servicemen or their families from suing the
government for personal injuries or loss of life arising from
activity incidental to military service. Logically, servicemen and
their families looking for due compensation began to bring prod-
ucts liability suits against the contractors who supplied the
military with ordered products that failed due to design or
manufacturing defects.32 As a result of the Feres holding, "con-
tractors found themselves paying for the government's design
defects." 3 3 These tort actions placed a heavy financial burden on
government contractors.
In addition to the heavy burden of the Feres ruling, in Stencel
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States3 4 the Court barred gov-
ernment contractors from seeking indemnity from the govern-
ment for damages that the state required the contractor to pay
to injured military servicemen under state tort actions when
injuries resulted from equipment that the government contractor
26. See, e.g., Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Comm'rs, 333 F. Supp. 353,
355 (E.D. La. 1971).
27. 28 U.S.C. 5 2671-2679.
28. Id. 5 2671.
29. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
30. Id. at 144.
31. Id. at 143. The Court also explained that the servicemen could not be doubly
compensated through use of the FTCA because they had access to an adequate compen-
sation system. Id. at 140, 146. Specifically, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes a no-
fault military compensation scheme. 38 U.S.C. SS 301-363 (1988).
32. See, e.g., Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 667-68 (1977).
33. Note, supra note 15, at 226.
34. 431 U.S. 666.
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manufactured in strict accordance with government specifica-
tions. 35 The Court reasoned that contractors could not implead
the government as a third-party defendant because trial would
"involve second-guessing military orders, and would often require
members of the Armed Services to testify in court as to each
other's decisions and actions."3 6
Government contractors supplying ordered equipment to the
military faced an insurmountable obstacle in the Feres-Stencel
doctrine.37 Under this doctrine, when a law required a government
contractor to adhere to government-generated specifications, the
courts could hold the contractor liable for personal injury and
property damage with no opportunity to seek indemnity from
the government.s Government contractors began looking for a
method by which they could benefit from the government's sov-
ereign immunity and protect themselves from being the ultimate
insurer of government designs and specifications for military
hardware.
Modern Formulations: The Circuit Split
The injustice of the strict application of the Feres-Stencel doc-
trine gave rise to modern formulations of the government con-
tractor defense at the circuit court level.39 Although the contractor
still could not seek indemnity from the government, courts ex-
tended immunity to the contractor in military products liability
settings if the contractor could meet certain proof elements.40
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was instrumental
in fashioning one version of the defense's modern formulation. In
McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.,41 a navy pilot was killed
35. Id. at 673-74.
36. Id. at 673.
37. Case Comment, supra note 1, at 947. See id. at 943-48 for a general discussion of
the FeresStencel doctrine. The Feres-Stencel doctrine was one of the primary rationales
underlying the modern government contractor defense. In Boyle, the Court specifically
rejected this doctrine, however, because it "produces results that are in some respects
too broad and in some respects too narrow:' Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 510 (1988).
38. Case Comment, supra note 1, at 947.
39. Id. at 947-55. The modern formulations of the government contractor defense create
tests that allow the extension of governmental immunity to contractors. Although the
Feres-Stencel doctrine remained the underlying rationale for the development of these
defenses, these tests afforded the courts more flexibility to soften the impact of the
doctrine's strict application on government contractors. Id.
40. Id. See infra notes 51-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the required
proof elements.
41. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
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by the impact against his plane during an emergency ejection.42
The court held that a supplier of military equipment would not
be liable for a design defect if:
(1) the United States is immune from liability under Feres and
Stencel, (2) the supplier proves that the United States estab-
lished, or approved, reasonably precise specifications for the
allegedly defective military equipment, (3) the equipment con-
formed to those specifications, and (4) the supplier warned the
United States about patent errors in the government's speci-
fications or about dangers involved in the use of the equipment
that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.43
The court of appeals justified this test with the standard policy
considerations that accompany most military products liability
cases against a government contractor. 44
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, faced with a
factual scenario similar to that in McKay, rejected the Ninth
Circuit's formulation of the government contractor defense and
established new standards for the use of the defense.45 In Shaw
v. Grumman Aerospace Corp. ,46 the court recognized the existence
of varying forms of the defense in other circuits, but refused to
accept any of these variations as adequate.4 7 The Eleventh Circuit
recognized a government contractor defense "based exclusively
on the theory that the constitutional separation of powers com-
pels the judiciary to defer to a military decision to use [certain
products] designed by an independent contractor, despite its risks
to servicemen.."48
42. Id. at 446.
43. Id. at 451.
44. See infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text for an explanation of the general
policy considerations supporting the government contractor defense in the military
products liability setting.
45. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1233 (1988).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 740. The Eleventh Circuit created a new formulation because it was not
satisfied with the McKay standard:
Since the military and its representatives are not before us in these suits
against contractors, we may not ask them for proof that [a judgment decision
by the military] was actually made. We may only require from the contractor
proof of the negative proposition-that the design in question does not
merely represent a judgment by the supplier.
Id. at 745.
48. Id. at 743. "The court's task is to inquire whether such a decision has been made
and, if not, to apply the standard principles of product liability law." Id. at 744.
[Vol. 32:399
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The Eleventh Circuit's formulation of the defense differed
markedly from the Ninth Circuit's formulation in that to escape
liability the contractor must affirmatively prove:
(1) that it did not participate, or participated only minimally,
in the design of those products or parts of products shown to
be defective; or (2) that it timely warned the military of the
risks of the design and notified it of alternative designs rea-
sonably known by the contractor, and that the military, al-
though forewarned, clearly authorized the contractor to proceed
with the dangerous design.49
Although the courts based these two tests on differing policy
considerations and presented the government contractor with
differing elements of proof, both contractors achieved their ob-
jective of acquiring protection in the military products liability
setting. The differing standards of McKay and Shaw formed the
basis for the modern government contractor defense in other
circuits. 0
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: Resolution of the Circuit
Split
In BoyZe v. United Technologies Corp.,-" the Supreme Court
clarified the elements and the proper use of the government
contractor defense and thereby resolved the confusion created
by its numerous variations. In Boyle, a helicopter copilot drowned
when his helicopter crashed off the Virginia coast.52 The copilot
was unable to escape through the designated emergency escape
hatch because of the faulty design of the escape hatch system
and because other equipment obstructed access to the escape
hatch handle.5 The Fourth Circuit applied a government con-
tractor defense modelled after the standard set forth in McKay
and absolved the contractor from liability.M
49. Id. at 746.
50. For example, the McKay formulation of the defense became the basis for the Boyle
formulation of the defense. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988);
see supra note 3.
51. 487 U.S. 500.
52. Id. at 502.
53. Id. at 502-03.
54. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414-15 (4th Cir. 1986), affd, 487
U.S. 500, 512 (1988). In deciding whether the contractor could raise the government
contractor defense to shield itself from liability, the court relied on the test set forth in
Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988).
This test is an adaptation of the McKay test discussed at supra text accompanying note
43.
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The Court first explained that before it can fashion a "federal
common law" defense, it must find the current dispute to be one
in which federal law preempts state law.5 5 Traditionally, courts
found preemption only if a "clear statutory prescription, or a
direct conflict between federal and state law existed." The Court
explained, however, that it would find preemption if the area
involved "'uniquely federal interests' ,,57 that "are so committed
by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal
control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where neces-
sary, by . . . so-called 'federal common law.' "58
The Court found preemption of state law in Boyle because it
determined "that the liability of independent contractors per-
forming work for the Federal Government, like the liability of
federal officials, is an area of uniquely federal interest."59 The
Court also pointed to prior cases in which it had held that
"obligations to and rights of the United States under its contracts
are governed exclusively by federal law. '60 The Court reasoned
that "[t]he imposition of liability on Government contractors will
directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the
contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by
the Government, or it will raise its price. Either way, the inter-
ests of the United States will be directly affected."6' 1 The area of
government contracts was therefore an area of uniquely federal
interest.62
In addition, the Court found preemption of state law due to a
"significant conflict" between state and federal law.6 The Court
55. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
56. Id. (citations omitted).
57. Id. (quoting Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640
(1981)).
58. Id. (citing United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-29 (1979); Banco
Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597
(1959); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1942)). Although it seems as if the Court has
recognized three distinct ways to demonstrate preemption, the decision in Boyle blends
the "significant conflict" and "uniquely federal interests" prongs into one threshold test.
See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
59. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505 n.1 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 504 (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-
94 (1973); Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); National Metro.
Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945); Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. at 366-67)).
61. Id. at 507.
62. Id.
63. Id. Although the Court could have found preemption based solely on its recognition
of a uniquely federal interest, it inexplicitly reinforced its finding through use of the
significant conflict test. See also Dorse v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 898 F.2d 1487, 1488-
90 (11th Cir. 1990) (in which the court applied the significant conflict test to find that no
conflict existed and, thus, that the government contractor defense did not apply).
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explained that "[d]isplacement [of state common law] will occur
only where . . . a 'significant conflict' exists between an identi-
fiable 'federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,'
or the application of state law would 'frustrate specific objectives'
of federal legislation. 64
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, reasoned that the FTCA
would suggest the outline of the significant conflict in the gov-
ernment contractor setting.6 5 Under the FTCA, "Congress au-
thorized damages to be recovered against the United States for
harm caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of Government
employees, to the extent that a private person would be liable
under the law of the place where the conduct occurred. '66 Con-
gress limited this consent to suit by adding the discretionary
function exception, which provides absolute sovereign immunity
from "[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government," regardless of whether the agency or employee
abused the discretion.67
The selection of an appropriate design for military equipment
is a discretionary function within the meaning of the exception
because it "involves not merely engineering analysis but [also]
judgment as to the balancing of many technical, military, and
even social considerations, including specifically the trade-off
between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness. '" State
-tort suits against contractors would permit second-guessing of
these judgments, producing the same effect that the FTCA dis-
cretionary function exemption sought to avoid 9 The Court rea-
soned:
The financial burden of judgments against the contractors
would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally,
64. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (citations omitted). In a case involving the possible use of
the government contractor defense, the Court explained that "[t]he conflict with federal
policy need not be as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary pre-emption when
Congress legislates 'in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.'" Id. (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). But see Hohenhaus, supra note
10, at 11 ("Examples supplied by the Court indicate that the federal-state conflict must
be clear and concrete, active not passive. The federal-state duties must be contradictory
or antithetical, not simply different.").
65. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
66. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
68. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
69. Id.
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to the United States itself, since defense contractors will pre-
dictably raise their prices to cover, or to insure against, con-
tingent liability for the Government-ordered designs .... It
makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial
liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military
equipment is necessary when the Government produces the
equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the production.70
Even if the government contractor can convince a court that
federal law should preempt state law, however, the government
contractor must fulfill the three-part test that the Supreme Court
promulgated in Boyle before the court will grant immunity.71 A
court cannot impose liability on the contractor pursuant to state
law "when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise
specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications;
and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers
in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but
not to the United States.."72
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the majority's creation
of the government contractor defense was an exercise of legis-
lative power that the Court should leave to Congress.73 Congress,
however, has remained silent on this issue, resisting the govern-
ment contractors' sustained campaign to legislate a form of the
defense.74 Brennan deduced that Congress' reluctance to legislate
relief for government contractors demonstrated its intent not to
extend the government's limited sovereign immunity to contrac-
tors .7
5
Even if Congress authorized the Court to create such a federal
common law defense in this area, Brennan argued that it should
70. Id. at 511-12.
71. Id. at 512-13.
72. Id. at 512. The first two elements of the defense assure that a government officer,
not merely the contractor itself, considered the design feature in question. Id. The third
element guards against the risk that "the displacement of state tort law would create
some incentive for the manufacturer to withhold knowledge of risks." Id. This element
protects the flow of information that is highly relevant to the discretionary decision. Id.
at 512-13.
73. Id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-
13 (1981)) ("The enactment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the
decision whether to displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the federal
judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through
their elected representatives in Congress.").
74. See id. at 515 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing six proposed bills concerning
limits on government contractor liability that were defeated in Congress).
75. Id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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not do so because federal law did not preempt state tort law.76
This litigation did not affect the "obligations to and rights of the
United States under its contracts"7 7 because it was an action
between two private parties.78 Brennan stated that the Court's
"6power to create federal common law controlling the Federal
Government's contractual rights and obligations does not translate
into a power to prescribe rules that cover all transactions or
contractual relationships collateral to Government contracts. '79
The Court could not find preemption because no uniquely federal
interest existed in a suit between two private parties, as the
claim against the manufacturer had "no direct effect upon the
United States or its Treasury."8
Brennan also pointed out that the Court has extended immunity
only to a "subset of 'officials of the Federal Government' and has
covered only 'discretionary' functions within the scope of their
legal authority."81 Courts should never extend immunity to a
private government contractor so as to "immunize the discre-
tionary acts of those who perform service contracts for the
Government."8 2 Brennan worried about extending sovereign im-
munity to nongovernmental entities, emphasizing that the Court
had never before suggested that sovereign immunity might ex-
tend beyond the narrow class of government employees and
agencies "to cover also nongovernment employees whose author-
ity to act is independent of any source of federal law and that
are as far removed from the 'functioning of the Federal Govern-
ment' as is a Government contractor. ' '8
Finally, Brennan explained that had this helicopter accident
occurred just three miles further off the coast, the Death on the
High Seas Act8 would have provided a wrongful death cause of
76. Id. at 516-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25,
29 (1977)).
81. Id. at 522 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan distinguished Boyle from Yearsley by
explaining that, unlike the respondent in Boyle, "the contractor in Yearsley was following,
not formulating, the Government's specifications . . . and followed them correctly." Id.
This distinction insinuates that the government contractor in Boyle exercised discretion
in fulfilling the government contract, thereby barring the contractor's claim that the
FTCA should define the existence of a significant conflict as explained by the majority.
83. Id. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959)).
84. 46 U.S.C. § 761-768 (1988).
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action against the government contractor.8 5 Brennan therefore
questioned how a state level tort suit against the same govern-
ment contractor could create a significant conflict with "'federal
interests . . . in the context of Government procurement,' when
federal law itself would provide a tort suit, but no (at least no
explicit) Government-contractor defense, against the same de-
signer for an accident involving the same equipment. 86
Policy Support for the Defense
The Supreme Court provided several policy arguments for the
limited extension of immunity to government contractors87 Other
appellate courts that have considered and recognized the govern-
ment contractor defense also listed policy arguments for the
creation of this defense in the military products liability setting.8
Some of these policy considerations are inapplicable in the envi-
ronmental tort setting because of their narrow application to the
military setting. Others, however, provide a broader base for the
defense and enable the making of analogies to determine whether
courts should extend this defense to government contractors in
the environmental tort setting.
In Boyle, the Court cited three main concerns supporting the
recognition of the government contractor defense. 9 First, the
Court considered the effect that imposition of liability would have
upon the cost of government contracts. 90 The Court feared that
"[t]he financial burden of judgments against the contractors would
ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the
United States itself, since defense contractors will predictably
85. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 529-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. See infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
88. Generally, the main policy considerations cited are: cost to the taxpayer, separation
of powers, second-guessing of military decisions, destruction of military morale, and
fairness. See, e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12; Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d
736, 741-44 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
89. A minor concern that the Court did not consider in Boyle is that the strength of
the relationship between the contractor and the government depends upon a free flow
of information and a close interplay between the parties. The absence of the government
contractor defense may sever this relationship because the contractor will attempt to
protect itself from liability. Thus, "by conditioning the application of the government
contractor defense on full disclosure to the government of all known risks . . . contractors
would have an incentive to work closely with . . . authorities in the development and
testing of equipment." Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 1985).
90. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
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raise their prices to cover, or to insure against, contingent lia-
bility for the Government-ordered designs."91
If the government contractor must bear liability, it will either
decide not to operate, precluding the government from acquiring
needed services, or it will pass along tort liability risk in the
form of price increases to the government and ultimately the
taxpayers.9 2 This pass-through of costs would defeat the practical
effect of the FTCA because the government would become indi-
rectly liable for a discretionary function and would lose these
funds from the Treasury. Other courts that recognized the de-
fense also cited this consideration as a reason for its creation.93
Second, the Court considered the unfairness that the govern-
ment contractor would suffer if it could not resort to this de-
fense.9 4 The Court believed it unfair to allow the government to
contract out "risky" work in order to avoid liability that it might
otherwise encounter.9 5 Liability should fall "on the wrongdoer
whose act or omission caused the injury."96 Accordingly, "in
91. Id. at 511-12. But see Judge Alarcon's dissent in McKay:
There is, however, no reason to believe that these costs are common, in
amount and frequency, between all military equipment suppliers. Those with
proven safety records may be able to secure liability insurance at much
lower rates than less careful suppliers. Presumably, such cost savings enable
these manufacturers to make lower bid prices and be more competitive.
Because the Military is free to pursue and accept these lower bids, they
help sharpen competition and keep the overall cost of bids down. Those
manufacturers who do suffer liability, because of unsafe equipment, will be
unable to pass on these costs freely due to the lower bids of their safer
competitors. . . . The free market system. . . insures that this cost transfer
will be minimized.
McKay, 704 F.2d at 457 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
92. "While distribution of the costs of mishaps to the consuming public may be a
familiar feature of products liability law, we are loathe to grant courts and juries a
similar power to swell the public costs of meeting the nation's requirements in national
security." Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1233 (1988); see also Brown, Energy Department Contractors and the Environment: A More
"Special Relationship," 37 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 86, 89 (Feb. 1990) ("Attempts to shift
liability for the Department [of Energy's] nuclear facilities to contractors only will drive
out more private concerns. The loss of private contractors would leave us with more
federal employees (cloaked with sovereign immunity)-and not necessarily any more
safety.").
93. See, e.g., Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408; Bynum, 770 F.2d at 565-66; McKay, 704 F.2d at
449; Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 357 (D. Kan. 1983); In re Agent Orange
Product Liability Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 794 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d
987 (2d Cir. 1980).
94. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510-11.
95. Id.
96. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 793; see also Bynum, 770 F.2d at 566 ("Principles of
fairness dictate that an innocent contractor should not be ultimately liable for a dangerous
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situations where the contractor ably performed a manufacturing
contract according to a detailed yet defective set of design
specifications, any resulting liability should be assumed by the
wrongdoer who authored those specifications. '97 In its interpre-
tation and application of the government contractor defense as
defined in Boyle, the Fifth Circuit explained that "the primary
purpose behind this formulation of the [government contractor]
defense is to prevent the contractor from being held liable when
the government is actually at fault but is protected."98
Third, the Court was careful not to disturb the separation of
powers doctrine by second-guessing a decision of a department
of the executive branch.9 9 In Tozer v. LTV Corp.,1°° the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit similarly recog-
nized the limitations on the powers of each branch and explained
its reluctance to second-guess when it stated that it is not "seemly
that a democracy's most serious decisions .. .be made by its
least accountable branch of government." 10 1
The government contractor defense not only protects the ex-
ecutive branch agency from judicial second-guessing, but also
relieves government contractors from reassessing the govern-
ment's decisions and specifications. 10 2 Absolving the government
contractor from second-guessing the government saves time and
money and ultimately protects the government from inflated
contract prices. 0 3 These three policy considerations are readily
design when the responsibility properly lies elsewhere."); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 696 F.2d 246, 252-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (contractors manufacturing products pursuant to
a government contract are not liable when they comply with government specifications
but may be liable when they perform negligently).
97. See Note, The Government Contract Defense: Is Sovereign Immunity a Necessary
Prerequisite?, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 495, 504-05 (1986) (citing Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp.
at 793); accord Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 358.
98. Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1478 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 327 (1989) (citing Bynum, 770 F.2d at 565). The FTCA protects the government.
Trevino is one of the few cases interpreting and applying the government contractor
defense as defined in Boyle.
99. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
100. 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988).
101. Id. at 405. The separation of powers concern is strong in the military setting
because cases in which "government specifications are at issue would 'involve second-
guessing military orders, and would often require members of the Armed Services to
testify in court as to each other's decisions and actions.' These trials would raise concerns
about their effect on military discipline, as well as on national security." McKay v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984)
(quoting Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977)).
102. See Note, supra note 97, at 502.
103. See, e.g., McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
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adaptable to support creation of the defense in the environmental
tort setting.
APPLICATION OF THE DEFENSE IN THE
ENVIRONMENTAL TORT SETTING
Successful application of the government contractor defense in
the military products liability setting naturally led to attempts
to extend this defense to analogous situations. For example, an
attempt to extend the defense into the environmental tort setting
occurred in Crawford v. National Lead Co.104 Crawford involved
a federally owned uranium metals production plant which a
private contractor operated for the government from 1951 through
1985.105 Fourteen thousand people who lived or worked near the
plant brought a $300 million lawsuit alleging that the government
contractor failed to prevent the emission of uranium and other
harmful materials'06 from the plant and that such failure caused
emotional distress and diminished property values.10 7 The con-
tractor "repeatedly informed the Energy Department of pressing,
potentially life-threatening problems at the . . . plant."'1 8 The
government was aware of the problems as early as 1951, even
as the facility was being built, but ignored the problems because
of the high cost of fixing them.10 9
The contractor sought a motion for summary judgment on the
104. 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1048 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
105. Id. at 1049.
106. Officials of Westinghouse Materials Corp., which replaced National Lead Co. as
operator of the facility in 1985, admitted that "the 1,050 acre site [was] contaminated
with many hot spots, including 8,800 tons of radioactive waste stored in silos and nearly
1,000 tons of thorium stored in leaking barrels." Judge rules against government in Fernald
suit, United Press Int'l, Feb. 14, 1989, BC cycle (Domestic News).
107. Crawford, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1049.
108. Reynolds, At Ohio Uranium Plant, A Cloud of Fear and Anger, Boston Globe, Oct.
25, 1988, at 3 ("Dustbags designed to filter uranium particles from the air were known
to explode once a month, expelling a thick blanket of contaminated air over the towns
surrounding the plant. Heavy rains regularly swept uranium particles from the plant into
the nearby Great Miami River.").
109. Id. The government admitted to having knowledge of the hazardous environmental
problems at the plant. Sherman, Atom-Plant Disclosure: Knowledge as a Sword?, Nat'l
L.J., Nov. 28, 1988, at 3, col. 2. The government may have made these admissions to
protect the contractor from liability under the theory that if the contractor could show
that it complied with the government's specifications and warned the government of
known defects and the government continued to approve the contractor's operating
procedures, the contractor would be absolved of liability under the government contractor
defense as defined in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). Sherman,
supra, at 22, cols. 1-2.
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basis that the government contractor defense, as defined in Boyle,
barred state law tort claims against a government contractor
that was merely following the government's directives.110 The
court denied this motion, stating that although the government
contractor defense may be applicable in the environmental tort
setting, it was not applicable under these specific circum-
stances."'
Interpreting Boyle, the court held that state tort law, under
which courts would find the contractor liable, would "be displaced
when (1) the subject matter involves 'uniquely federal interests';
and (2) 'a "significant conflict" exists between an identifiable
"federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law" . ..
or the application of state law would "frustrate specific objec-
tives" of federal legislation.' "112 If these two threshold require-
ments for displacement are met, then a consideration of the three
limiting elements as explained in Boyle will determine the scope
of such displacement." 3
The court in Crawford determined that no significant conflict
existed between federal and state laws or interests because "[the
government contractor's] actions giving rise to the state law tort
claims also violated applicable [federal] environmental laws."14
Federal law did not preempt state law because the government
contractor had a duty to comply with the environmental laws
during the operation of the plant.115 The imposition of a state
tort law duty was not an additional duty placed upon the con-
tractor, but merely an alternative way of ensuring that the
contractor would meet this duty to the public.116
110. Crawford, 29 Env't Rep. Gas. (BNA) at 1050.
111. Id. at 1053-54. The court noted that "[aplthough the Boyle court discussed the
government contractor defense within the context of a procurement contract, the defense
is viable with regard to performance contracts." Id. at 1053 n.7 (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at
506; Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 18 (1940)).
112. Id. at 1053 (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (citations omitted)).
113. Id. The court in Crawford briefly listed these three factors as:
1. government approved specifications,
2. conformity to specifications, and
3. contractor warning of dangers it knew of which were unknown to the
government.
Id. (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512).
114. Id. The court found that the government contractor violated the Atomic Energy
Commission's ALARA ("as low as reasonably achievable") policy, 10 C.F.R. 5 20.1 (1990);
the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 5 407 (1988); and the Standards for Protection Against
Radiation, 10 C.F.R. 5 20.1-20.601 (1988). Crawford, 29 Env't Rep. Gas. (BNA) at 1054.
115. Crawford, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1053.
116. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509. The court in Crawford also hinted that even "[i]f the
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Obstacles in the Environmental Tort Setting: Meeting Threshold
Requirements
The court in Crawford refused to allow the government con-
tractor to resort to the government contractor defense because
it determined that the contractor could not meet the threshold
requirements of the defense.117 In Boyle, the Supreme Court
stated that before a contractor could raise the federal common
law defense, it would have to prove that federal law preempted
state law.1 18
Preemption of State Law
M'Culloch v. Maryland"19 established the principle "that the
States may not exercise their sovereign powers so as to control
those instrumentalities of the United States which have been
judged necessary and proper to carry into effect federal laws
and policies."l12 Chief Justice Marshall, famous for his comments
concerning federalism, explained that:
The American people have declared their constitution and the
laws made in pursuance thereof, to be supreme ....
Boyle threshold requirements were met, the contractor defense could be defeated on
grounds that [the contractor] did not conform to government approved specifications for
operation of the [facility]." Crawford, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1055 n.13. The court
declined to decide this question, however, because the defendant's inability to meet the
threshold requirements convinced the court to disallow the defense. Id.
As a result of the court's ruling, the Department of Energy (DOE) reached an out-of-
court settlement with the complaining citizens for $73 million. Radioactive Waste: DOE
to Settle Fernald Class-Action Claims by Establishing $73 Million Citizens Fund, 20 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 532 (July 14, 1989). The settlement places the money in a fund to pay for
medical monitoring of individuals and to settle the claims of individuals who have suffered
emotional distress. Id. The fund also compensates residents who claim that their property
values have diminished. Id. This is the first time that DOE agreed to make money
available for such purposes. Id. DOE agreed to make this settlement on behalf of its
government contractor under the stipulation that the settlement agreement not fix
liability or blame, as DOE consistently maintained that the plant operations did not harm
anyone. Id.
117. Crawford, 29 Env't Rep. Gas. (BNA) at 1055 n.13.
118. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
119. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
120. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 186-87 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
In Goodyear Atomic Corp., Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, noted that "a
federally owned facility performing a federal function is shielded from direct state
regulation, even though the federal function is carried out by a private contractor, unless
Congress clearly authorizes such regulation." Id. at 181 (emphasis added). The Court
believed that Congress could "reasonably determine that incidental regulatory pressure
[by the states] is acceptable, whereas direct regulatory authority is not." Id. at 186.
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. . . The result is a conviction that the states have no power
• . . to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to
carry into execution the powers vested in the general govern-
ment.1
21
Under the supremacy clause, 12 the proper focus in an analysis
of the relationship between state and federal law is not the
state's purpose for adopting a given provision, but rather the
provision's actual effect on the operation of a federal instrumen-
tality and its ability to achieve the objectives of federal law and
policy for which it was created.'2
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,'24 the Court explained that
federal law can preempt state law in either of two general ways:
[1] If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any
state law falling within that field is pre-empted. [2] If Congress
has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in
question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually
conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to
comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. 12
In Silkwood, the government contractor argued that the state-
authorized award of punitive damages for harm caused by radi-
ation exposure was a form of indirect state regulation in a
prohibited field because it would punish and deter safety-oriented
conduct related to radiation hazards.126 After reviewing the leg-
islative history of the Atomic Energy Act,' the Court rejected
this argument and held that the contractor was subject to puni-
tive damages because the imposition of these damages did not
121. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 432, 436.
122. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
123. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 188 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971)).
124. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
125. Id. at 248 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The second technique for finding
preemption that the Court described in Silkwood constitutes the significant conflict
approach used in Boyle. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
126. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249. The contractor contended that federal law and policy
barred the state from regulating the nuclear facility in any way, direct or indirect. Id.
127. 42 U.S.C. S 2011-2296 (1988); see Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 250-56.
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conflict with federal regulation. 1  The Court did not suggest,
however, that no instance could ever exist in which federal law
would preempt the recovery of damages based on state law.129
Instead, it described the test that courts must apply when de-
termining whether state law frustrated compliance with federal
law:
[P]re-emption should not be judged on the basis that the
Federal Government has so completely occupied the field of
safety that state remedies are foreclosed but on whether there
is an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state stan-
dards or whether the imposition of a state standard in a damages
action would frustrate the objectives of the federal law. 30
According to Justice Powell's dissent, the majority's decision
"authorize[d] lay juries and judges in each of the States to make
regulatory judgments as to whether a federally licensed nuclear
facility is being operated safely."''1 In addition, the decision in
Silkwood came less than one year after the Court explicitly held
that "federal law has 'pre-empted' all 'state safety regulation' [in
the atomic energy field] except certain limited powers 'expressly
ceded to the States.' "132
Boyle: Preemption in the Government Contractor Setting
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,'3 the Supreme Court
again attempted to explain the narrow instances in which federal
law would preempt state law. When attempting to apply the
government contractor defense, a court may find preemption in
either of two circumstances: (1) if a clear statutory prescription
existed, or (2) if federal law directly conflicted with state law.3 4
The Court also explained that in a few areas of uniquely federal
128. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249, 256-57. The Court explained that "[p]aying both federal
fines and state-imposed punitive damages for the same incident would not appear to be
physically impossible. Nor does exposure to punitive damages frustrate any purpose of
the federal remedial scheme." Id. at 257.
129. Id. at 256.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 274 (Powell, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983)). In Pacific Gas, the Court concluded that federal
nuclear safety regulations preempted state safety regulations. Pacifw Gas, 461 U.S. at
205.
133. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
134. I& at 504.
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interest it could preempt state law and create "federal common
law."'135 The Court held that federal law preempts state tort law
in the military products liability setting because (1) military
decisions concerning equipment specifications are within an area
of uniquely federal interest, and (2) a significant conflict exists
between federal and state law.136
In Crawford, the court applied the government contractor
defense as defined in Boyle and disqualified the contractor's use
of the government contractor defense because the contractor
could not meet the specific technique used to find preemption in
Boyle.137 The court failed to consider the overall threshold ques-
tion of whether federal law, regulation, policy, or interest pre-
empted state law in any way. If the contractor can prove that
use of any of the Supreme Court-approved approaches to pre-
emption should preempt state law, then a court should allow it
to use the government contractor defense to shield itself from
environmental tort liability.
Overcoming Obstacles
Commentators and courts have recognized that the evolution
of the preemption doctrine has resulted in a strong presumption
against preemption.w Boyle represents a small minority of tort
135. Id. These areas of uniquely federal interest include those areas that "are so
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state
law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed
... by the courts-so-called 'federal common law.'" Id.
136. Id. at 507-12. In Boyle, the Court confused the preemption analysis through its
cloudy application of preemption doctrine. Although it first explained that federal law
would preempt state law if either a significant conflict between federal and state law
existed, or a uniquely federal interest existed over which the federal government should
have exclusive control, the Court combined these two distinct thresholds into one
threshold requirement. Id. at 504, 507. According to the Court, the government contractor
can prove preemption by showing either that Congress expressly preempted state law
through clear statutory language, or that Congress impliedly preempted state law by a
showing of a significant conflict and a uniquely federal interest. The Court gave no
explanation for its departure from standard preemption doctrine. This extra obstacle will
increase the heavy burden on the government contractor of showing preemption.
On the other hand, the Court in Boyle may not have been confused in its analysis but
may simply have shown that preemption can be found in two distinct and independent
ways. Courts applying the Boyie formulation of the defense, however, have required that
the contractor prove both elements before federal law will preempt state law. See, e.g.,
Crawford v. National Lead Co., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1048, 1053 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
137. Crawford, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1053-55.
138. See, e.g., Darling v. Mobil Oil Corp., 864 F.2d 981, 986 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) ("In areas traditionally regulated by
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cases in which courts found preemption. Silkwood, more repre-
sentative of the majority of tort cases, suggests that even if the
imposition of state tort law punitive damages upon a federal
instrumentality results in indirect regulation, no preemption of
state law will occur.
Expressed Preemption
The easiest and most obvious way to overcome the preemption
problem is to show that Congress or a federal agency clearly
expressed that federal law is to preempt state tort law in the
specific area. To prove expressed preemption, the contractor
must find a statutory provision or some other evidence of legis-
lative intent that clearly mandates preemption.139 Unfortunately,
few environmental statutes have such clear provisions.140 If fed-
state law, 'we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not [sic] superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.' "); see also, Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption, 5
CONST. COMMENTARY 311, 311-12 (1988) ("[IThe Supreme Court ... had already anticipated
its strong presumption against preemption.").
139. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
140. See Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Statutes [that
have antipreemptive provisions] . . . save common law remedies even when federal law
exclusively determines the content of substantive rules."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080
(1989).
Many environmental statutes do not have a clear preemption provision but instead
explicitly provide that federal law should not preempt state law. Congress first used the
broad language of these savings clauses in the following passage of the CWA: "Nothing
in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or
limitation or to seek other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State
agency)." Clean Water Act § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(e) (1988). This language served as
the basis for similar savings clauses in subsequent environmental statutes. See, e.g.,
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 5 520(e), 30 U.S.C. S 1270(e) (1988);
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 SS 105(g)(5), 106(g), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1415(g)(5), 1416(g) (1988); Public Health Service Act S 1449(e), 42 U.S.C. S 300j-S(e)
(1988); Solid Waste Disposal Act § 7002(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f); Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977 S 304(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980 § 309(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. S 9658(a)(2).
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to interpret the effect of the broad language
in the CWA savings clause in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
Although the CWA would preclude suits that may require standards of control "that are
incompatible with those established by the procedures set forth in the Act[,]. . . nothing
in the Act bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim." Id. at 497. An
action brought against the contractorloperator would not frustrate the goals of the federal
environmental statute. Id. at 498; see also Ogden Envtl. Servs. v. City of San Diego, 687
F. Supp. 1436, 1444 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (Congress, by way of a savings clause in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, clearly mandated that the federal statute would not
preempt state law); Donnelly & Van Ness, The Warrior and the Druid-The DOD and
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eral statutes or actions do not contain expressed or implied
preemption, the contractor must resort to the uniquely federal
interests or significant conflict test that the Court laid out in
Boyle.141
Uniquely Federal Interest
In Boyle, the Court did not give a clear-cut definition of a
uniquely federal interest, but it did give several examples to
illustrate this principle. First, the federal government's procure-
ment of equipment is an area of uniquely federal interest.
142
Second, a dispute between a military victim of a products liability
accident and the private manufacturer that the federal govern-
ment contracted to make the product implicates the interests of
the United States. 143 Finally, federal law exclusively governs the
United States' rights and obligations under its contracts.
4 4
Under this last example, the government contractor should try
to convince the court that a contract requiring the government
contractor to perform an environmentally sensitive operation
without significant independent discretion is a uniquely federal
interest because it involves the rights and obligations of the
federal government. This argument for recognizing a uniquely
federal interest is especially strong if the contractor can show
that the authority to enter into the contract and regulate the
operations of the facility has its origin in the Constitution and
the statutes of the United States and in no way depends upon
the laws of any state.145 -
The Court also has found that the "civil liability of federal
officials for actions taken in the course of their duty" is another
area of federal concern warranting the displacement of state
statutes passed since 1970, Congress has included provisions that abandon protection of
federal facilities for state rules); Hill, Preemption of State Common Law Remedies by
Federal Environmental Statutes: International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q.
541 (1987) (noting the Court's reasoning in Ouellette that the permit scheme of the CWA
would not be undermined if the 'nuisance law of the state where the discharge occurred
were applied to a given case, but would be undermined if the conflicting standards of
multiple states where injuries occurred were applied).
141. See supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
142. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506.
143. See id. at 502-03, 507.
144. Id. at 504 (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-
94 (1973)).
145. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
[Vol. 32:399
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
law. 146 Again, the Court emphasized that even though Boyle
involved an independent contractor performing its obligation
under a procurement contract rather than an official performing
his duty as a federal employee, "the same interest in getting the
Government's work done" is obviously implicated.147 If the con-
tractor cannot demonstrate a uniquely federal interest, the con-
tractor's last hope for preemption lies in demonstrating that a
significant conflict exists between the application of state law
and the proper functioning of federal law.
Significant Conflicts
Courts must recognize preemption if compliance with both state
and federal law is impossible.'4 A significant conflict exists "where
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.' 4 9 If compliance with
both state and federal law is not physically impossible, however,
no conflict exists.10 State law must present "fairly high" obstacles
to the proper operation of federal law before courts will infer
preemption.' 51 The Supreme Court determined that in the gov-
ernment contractor setting, "[t]he conflict with federal policy need
not be as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary preemption
when Congress legislates 'in a field which the States have tra-
ditionally occupied.' "152
Although the contractor's proof of the existence of a significant
conflict may seem difficult, the Court in Boyle explained that the
contractor could satisfy the significant conflict requirement by
showing that the government officer(s) or agency that had ulti-
mate control over the government contractor had exercised au-
thorized discretion in judgments concerning the orders given to
146. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505.
147. Id. "[Tihe liability of independent contractors performing work for the Federal
Government, like the liability of federal officials, is an area of uniquely federal interest."
Id- at 505 n.1.
148. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
149. Id.
150. See Rotunda, supra note 138, at 317 ("If dual compliance is not 'physically impos-
sible,' as in Silkwood, there is no 'actual conflict.'" (citing Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248)); see
also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) ("A holding
of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable . . . where compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility ..
151. Rotunda, supra note 138, at 318.
152. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)). The Court offered no explanation for this relaxed degree of conflict in the
government contractor setting.
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the contractor.15a If the discretionary function exception of the
FTCA would render the government officer immune,15 the courts
should not allow the state to second-guess or intrude upon his
discretionary decisions concerning the control of the government
contractor and the government-owned facility. 55 Congress specif-
ically provided for immunity when a government official exercised
authorized discretion to give the official the capacity to make
these important decisions without fear of state tort liability.'5
When the governmental activity complained of involves conduct
rooted in policy matters, the discretionary function exception will
bar tort suits unless the plaintiff can establish a violation of
specific and mandatory requirements that restricted the discre-
tion or judgment of the governmental employees who performed
the task.57 Unfortunately, most environmental statutes restrict
the government's ability to act contrary to their mandates. 1'
The government's decision to award a contract to a particular
contractor is a discretionary function in that "[d]eciding to award
a government. . . contract to a particular manufacturer involves
weighing various facts and policies and this is discretionary in
nature."'159 Even if the government retains a generalized role in
monitoring contractor compliance with safety requirements, the
discretionary function exception bars suit.160 Courts have found
government involvement in such matters actionable only when
''government inspections of private entities involved situations
in which highly specific, mandatory obligations involving no judg-
ment were flatly disregarded."' 6'
Although one may argue that a significant conflict exists based
on the fact that the government employees controlling the con-
tractor and the project exercised authorized discretion, the Court
153. Id. at 511-12.
154. 28 U.S.C. S 2671 (1988).
155. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12.
156. Id.
157. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 535-36 (1988).
158. See infra note 207. The government contractor in Crawford v. National Lead Co.,
29 Env't Rep. Gas. (BNA) 1048 (S.D. Ohio 1989), encountered this problem and could not
use the government contractor defense. Thus, "[t]he discretionary function exception will
not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of
action for [a government] employee to follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful
option but to adhere to the directive." Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
159. McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303, 307 (8th Cir. 1985).
160. Feyers v. United States, 749 F.2d 1222, 1226-27 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1125 (1985).
161. Fishback & Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHo L. REV. 291, 309 (1988).
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in Boyle furnished an example that seems to preclude an exten-
sion of this argument into the environmental tort setting. The
Court stated that if the contractor could comply with both its
contractual obligations and the state-prescribed duty of care,
federal law generally would not preempt state law. 62 The Court
used the example of a federal government contract for the pur-
chase and installation of an air conditioning unit to illustrate this
principle. 6 3 The government contract in this example specified
the cooling capacity but not the precise manner of construction,
and a state law imposed a duty of care upon the manufacturer
of such units to include a certain safety feature.'r This state-
imposed duty was neither identical nor contrary to anything that
the contractor promised the government.' 65 In this situation, the
contractor had to live up to both federal contract and state law
standards because each standard could operate independently
without interference from the other. 66 The contractor, therefore,
could not use compliance with one duty as a defense for noncom-
pliance with the other duty.
In Miree v. DeKalb County,1'67 a private plaintiff did not seek
to impose upon the government contractor a duty contrary to
that which the government contract imposed, but rather sought
to enforce the contractual duty itself.'68 An intermediate situation
existed "in which the duty sought to be imposed on the contractor
[was] not identical to one assumed under the contract, but [was]
also not contrary to any assumed."' 69 Like the contractor in the
Court's air conditioner purchase example in Boyle, the contractor
in Miree could comply with both its contractual obligations and
the state-prescribed duty of care without compromising either
duty.1'70 The Court therefore suggested that federal law generally
would not preempt state law in this context.'7 By contrast, in




166. Id. This example seems similar to the holding in Silkwood, which required the
contractor to comply with federal as well as state duties even though federal control was
pervasive. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
167. 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
168. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 508.
169. Id. at 509. An example of this intermediate situation is the air conditioning unit
purchase contract hypothetical that the Court presented in Boyle. See supra notes 162-66
and accompanying text.
170. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509.
171. Id.
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Boyle, the state-imposed duty of care that formed the asserted
basis of the contractor's liability was precisely contrary to the
duty that the government contract imposed.172
Under certain environmental laws, specific provisions mandate
that the federal government comply with these statutes to protect
human health and welfare.1 73 A state-imposed duty to cease and
desist from harming the health and personal or real property of
others is not contrary to the statutory duty that Congress has
seen fit to impose upon all branches of the federal government.
Even though compliance with environmental laws may hinder or
present an almost insurmountable obstacle for the accomplish-
ment of a federal government policy or objective, the courts will
most likely not find a significant conflict because Congress has
decided that the protection of human life and the environment
should take precedence over the accomplishment of certain gov-
ernmental objectives.1 74 In this sense, the state-imposed duty and
the statutorily-imposed duty are identical and the government
contractor's request to use the government contractor defense
amounts to nothing more than a request by a surrogate of the
federal government to be exempt from duties that the federal
government has imposed upon itself.
Policy Arguments for an Extension of the Defense into the
Environmental Tort Setting
The arguments for finding federal preemption of state law in
order to authorize extension of the government contractor de-
fense into the environmental tort setting are tenuous at best. To
aid in the argument for recognition of the defense, the govern-
ment contractor should emphasize the necessity for the defense
as supported by the traditional policy reasons underlying the
existence of the defense in the military products liability setting.
Even though contractors encounter difficulties in meeting the
defense's threshold requirements in the environmental tort set-
ting, the courts should still allow the government contractor to
resort to the defense to avoid injustice. One can analogize three
main policy arguments from the military products liability set-
172. Id. The state-imposed duty was "the duty to equip helicopters with the sort of
escape-hatch mechanism petitioner claims was necessary," whereas the contractual duty
was "the duty to manufacture and deliver helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch
mechanism shown by the specifications." Id.




ting: the fairness of the defense, the separation of powers prob-
lem, and the cost considerations.
The imposition of tort liability benefits society because it forces
the reallocation of resources from the tortious actor to the in-
nocent victim, but "[b]efore any societal benefit can be derived
from the deterrent effects of tort liability, . . . the party in a
position to correct the tortious act or omission must be held
accountable for the damages caused and thus motivated to pre-
vent future torts."175 When the government compels the contrac-
tor to comply with its performance specifications and thereby to
commit a tort, the government rather than the contractor is
ultimately at fault; thus, tort liability should properly fall upon
the government rather than the innocent contractor.176 The bur-
den of tort liability should follow the benefit that the government
receives from the private operation of a federally owned facil-
ity.177 Principles of tort liability "seek to impose liability on the
wrongdoer whose act or omission caused the injury, not on the
otherwise innocent contractor whose only role in causing the
injury was the proper performance of a plan supplied by the
government."' 78
If the FTCA shields the government from liability, it should
likewise shield the contractor in the employ of the government.
The courts should not allow the government to commit a tort by
contracting out its duty of care to another party, thus escaping
liability, if it could not commit the action on its own without
escaping liability. 79
Ultimately, government contractor tort liability will fall upon
an innocent party not responsible for the tort, namely, the tax-
175. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 793-94 (E.D.N.Y.),
rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980).
176. The victim of the tort will argue that the court should regard him, and not the
contractor, as the truly innocent party. The court may wish to characterize the contractor
as having "dirtier" hands because it manufactured the defective product or carried out
the government's faulty instructions. If the contractor had no input or discretion in the
design or manufacturing stages, the court should only hold it liable in proportion to its
responsibility, which would be none. See Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351,
358-59 (D. Kan. 1983).
177. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE: A FAIR
DEFENSE OR THE CONTRACTOR'S SHIELD? 62 (J. Madole ed. 1986).
178. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 793.
179. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) ("It makes little
sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for the judgment that a
particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the Government produces the
equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the production.").
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payer. 180 If the courts bar the contractor's use of the government
contractor defense, the government contractor will ultimately
pass the costs awarded to plaintiffs on to the taxpayers in the
form of cost overruns or price increases on subsequent jobs.'8'
This problem may not be recognizable at first because the gov-
ernment will receive low bids from contractors that have not yet
been subject to liability. In the long run, however, if suits against
contractors continue, either large payments in damages or high
costs of liability insurance will affect all contractors. These con-
cerns should prompt the judiciary 82 to extend this immunity to
the government contractor in environmental tort situations, as
it has already done in the military products liability setting.
The concern of second-guessing the military in the products
liability setting also exists in the environmental tort setting. The
federal agency should be free from judicial second-guessing when
making decisions concerning the accomplishment of congression-
ally authorized objectives.183 In the environmental setting, courts
have shown a reluctance to second-guess Environmental Protec-
tion Agency decisions concerning the environment, deferring to
the executive branch Agency's statutory interpretations and im-
plementations as long as the Agency can show a reasonable basis
for its actions.84 Courts should recognize the applicability of the
180. The innocent party may be the consumer in the products liability setting or the
taxpayer in the government contracts setting.
181. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12; Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 407 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565-66 (5th
Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1043 (1984). The taxpayer, however, ultimately will bear the costs regardless of
whether the government bears liability directly or whether the contractor bears the
liability and passes these liability costs on to the government. The government contractor
defense simply removes one step in this cost passing process. Assuming that the govern-
ment's actions are immune, and that this immunity can be extended to the government
contractor, the victim of the tort will bear all costs. Although this result seems inequitable,
Congress possesses the authority to declare such policy through the FTCA.
182. Or, preferably, the legislature will respond to these concerns. See infra notes 193-
200 and accompanying text.
183. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-44 (1984). Although Congress expresses agency objectives through legislation, federal
environmental laws limit the agency's means to accomplish these objectives. See infra
note 207. The role of the reviewing court, therefore, is not to second-guess the agency's
decisions, but rather to determine whether the agency's actions comply with federal
statutory law.
184. For example, in Chevron, the Court stated:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing
political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy prefer-
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government contractor defense in the environmental setting to
avoid these separation of powers concerns.
ALTERNATIVES TO AVOID THE USE OF THE DEFENSE
Preemption may be an incorrect argument in the environmental
tort setting. The mechanical determination of whether federal
law preempts state law should not dictate fairness in the allo-
cation of liability. Courts should recognize the extension of the
government contractor defense as a policy matter based on fair-
ness to the contractor, who is not responsible for the federal
government's actions.
If the government were to deny all sovereign immunity, the
courts would recognize the government as the liable party in the
environmental tort setting due to its breach of duty towards
private citizens injured as a result of its faulty operation plans
and procedures. Because the government has unilaterally decided
to limit its consent to tort suits through the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA, the government contractor bears the
ultimate consequences of the government's decisions dictating
the proper plans and procedures that the contractor must fol-
low. 8" When Congress decided that the federal government would
not be responsible for the consequences flowing from discretion-
ary functions, it merely decided that the loss should fall some-
where else. In circumstances involving only the private citizen
and the government, the loss would fall upon the private citizen
injured by the tortfeasor's actions. Plaintiffs' lawyers, however,
sniffed out the money in the deep pockets of the government
contractors like a hound seeking the weary fox.
ences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon
the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judg-
ments....
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather
than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress,
the challenge must fail.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
185. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504, 511-13, for a discussion of the threshold requirements
of the defense. This legal maneuvering involves the application of legal reasoning devel-
oped centuries ago to situations that the creating jurists had not contemplated. Although
preemption doctrine may be an eternal truth of American legal thought, its application
in this setting creates sufficient injustice to warrant carving out an area of extended
sovereign immunity for certain contractors.
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In the military products liability setting, the government felt
comfortably insulated under the FTCA and the Feres-Stencel
doctrine because plaintiffs could not sue the government either
directly or indirectly. 18 6 The government, however, soon realized
that government contractors would not tolerate submitting them-
selves to actions in tort and insuring products they did not
design. Like all smart businessmen who have gained control over
a lucrative market, the contractors decided to pass along the
costs of litigation and judgments to the government and even-
tually the taxpayer, thereby subjecting the government to indi-
rect tort liability and defeating the purpose of the Feres-Stencel
doctrine and the FTCA. Once& the contractors discovered this
tactic, the government realized the trouble it had created. Now,
the government was paying not just for the occasional tort claim,
but also was paying indirectly for all judgments that the con-
tractor suffered and any risk that the contractor foresaw.1' This
consequence would eventually raise all contract prices to the
government, regardless of whether a tort action was the result
of the ordered product or the service of a particular contractor.
1
To reduce the price of its procurement contracts and to protect
the taxpayers, 89 the government extended its sovereign immu-
nity to government contractors in the very narrow area of mili-
tary products liability actions brought by servicemen or their
families. 90 Other government contractors will soon line up to
take advantage of this defense to avoid the costs of litigation
and cost pass-through to the government. 191 Currently, however,
the government will not allow the contractor who involuntarily
caused a tort through violation of environmental laws to seek
protection under this defense, even if the contractor had obeyed
the government's orders. The defense is unavailable not because
widely differing policy considerations would prohibit use of the
defense, but because contractors have been unable to successfully
manipulate the legal reasoning behind the preemption doctrine
186. See supra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
187. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
188. Id. at 506.
189. Or perhaps the government's motivation was to protect its political positions by
not overly taxing the private citizen.
190. See, e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510; Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474,
1479 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 327 (1989); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,
778 F.2d 736, 740 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988); McKay v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
191. See, e.g., Crawford v. National Lead Co., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1048 (S.D. Ohio
1989); see also sources cited supra note 10.
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to extend the immunity to the contractor in the environmental
tort setting.192
Although some may argue that the environmental tort setting
involves different policy considerations, in all fairness, courts
should not permit the federal government to order the contractor
to operate in a certain manner and reap the benefits of this
illegal operation and then to disassociate itself completely from
the contractor as soon as the contractor is caught violating the
law and "brought to justice." To promote fairness, courts should
extend the government contractor defense, not only to the en-
vironmental tort setting, but also to any other setting involving
government contractors. The confusing principles of the preemp-
tion doctrine and the convenient antipreemptive or savings pro-
visions in all major federal environmental laws block this extension
in the environmental tort setting.
Legislative Extension
The preemption doctrine will stand as an insurmountable ob-
stacle in the path of a federal court trying to extend the defense
to the environmental tort setting. 9 3 Instead of expending energy
to persuade a court that preemption exists, the contractors should
follow Justice Brennan's suggestion in Boyle v. United Technolo-
gies Corp.194 In his dissent, Brennan argued that fashioning a
government contractor defense is a legislative duty that the
judiciary must not usurp. 95 This statement, however, is only
partially correct. The legislature appears to have authorized
implicitly the courts' fashioning of this federal common law de-
fense in the military products liability setting because of the
relative ease of demonstrating preemption.95 In the environmen-
tal setting, however, legislative action may be the only way to
extend the government contractor defense due to the combination
of modern American jurisprudence and the antipreemptive pro-
visions of the statutes involved.
This legislative action to obtain the desired result of extending
immunity to the government contractor may take two forms.
First, Congress could simply amend the environmental statutes
192. See supra notes 137-72 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
194. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
195. Id. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. See id. at 504; Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 567 (5th Cir. 1985).
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to abolish the antipreemptive provisions or to limit antipreemp-
tion to circumstances not involving government contractors that
operate without independent discretion in obedience to the gov-
ernment's directives. This alternative does not seem realistic
based on Congress' track record of including antipreemptive
provisions in the majority of the major environmental statutes,
beginning with the CWA.197
Traditionally, antipreemption has been an excellent method of
establishing and promoting two separate systems that serve to
realize the same objective. Nevertheless, one might inquire
whether antipreemptive provisions are necessary. If such provi-
sions did not exist, federal law would only preempt state law if
the suit involved uniquely federal interests or if the operation of
federal law conflicted significantly with the application of state
law. Otherwise, when state law and federal law were in harmony
rather than in conflict, the preemption issue would not even arise
because resort to either court -system would achieve the same
objective. Realistically, Congress probably would be extremely
reluctant to amend the host of environmental laws to promote
fairness to this very narrow class of government contractors.
Second, if Congress refuses to amend environmental statutes
to exclude or limit antipreemptive provisions as a means of
rectifying the unfair situation in which government contractors
find themselves, Congress may consider the tactic of legislating
a form of the government contractor defense and defining the
situations in which a contractor may use it.198 Legislating a form
of the defense would promote the fairness that is due any
government contractor that carries out the government's will
without discretion.
Some may argue that regardless of the inherent unfairness
that contractors may suffer in some circumstances, all contractors
should bear some responsibility for their individual actions. Oth-
erwise, contractors could "get away with murder" simply by
relying on this defense. Although this theory could gain support
in the abstract, the legislature could largely avoid this undesir-
able result by putting realistic constraints on the contractors'
197. The CWA was the first major federal environmental statute that Congress passed.
Congress patterned many provisions within subsequent federal environmental statutes
after, and sometimes even adopted provisions verbatim from, the CWA. See, e.g., supra
note 140.
198. The legislature could define the defense in much the same way that the Court
defined it in Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512, or it could take into consideration the peculiarities
of general categories of situations and thereby modify the defense.
432 [Vol. 32:399
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
use of the government contractor defense, thereby increasing
contractor responsibility and accountability. 199
Pragmatically, drastic legislative changes such as those sug-
gested above will have a small chance at survival in the chambers
of Congress. 210 When someone brings a government contractor
into litigation for consequences of illegal environmental actions
that the federal government authorized and ordered, the con-
tractor finds itself in a no win situation. The contractor loses if
it tries to resort to the judicially defined government contractor
defense and argues that a court should extend the defense into
the environmental tort setting because it cannot overcome the
traditional, deep-rooted preemption doctrine, a necessary thresh-
old before a court will even consider application of the defense.
The contractor also loses if it decides to focus its efforts on
Congress because of congressional reluctance to legislate a form
of the defense.
Contractual Protection
A second method to protect the government contractor that
performs environmentally sensitive actions may be to develop
preventative measures that would ensure, as well as possible,
that potential liability would shift away from the government
contractor, preferably to the government, through contractual
provisions such as indemnification provisions. Realistically, how-
ever, the government will be extremely reluctant to give up its
sovereign immunity and assume tort liability through indemnifi-
cation agreements. The federal government will therefore prob-
ably summarily dismiss this technique for shifting liability to the
actual wrongdoer.
Contribution
Finally, the contractor may wish to enter into a performance
contract with the government and forego any attempt at nego-
tiations for an express indemnification provision for environmen-
tal torts resulting from the government's negligent designs or
operations plans. Instead, the contractor may wait until someone
199. See supra note 72 and accompanying text for an example of limitations of a
judicially created government contractor defense.
200. See, for example, Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515 n.1, for a list of the contractors' failed
attempts to lobby Congress to codify some form of the defense.
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brings an environmental tort action against it and then implead
the government as a third-party defendant, seeking contribution
or indemnification from the government for its negligent or
wrongful conduct.
At first glance, the rationale behind the narrowly defined
government contractor defense may seem to bar the contractor
from seeking indemnity or contribution from the government.20 1
For example, because Boyle involved fatal injury to a serviceman,
the Stencel prohibition against indemnification or contribution
would bar the contractor's action in this limited setting.20 2 Envi-
ronmental torts, however, affect many people, and if no service-
men are involved as victims, the Stencel prohibition does not
apply, leaving the door cracked for a contractor to seek some
compensation from the government.
Even though the contractor may have a potential way to hold
the government accountable for its harmful actions, the govern-
ment may attempt to bar the indemnity/contribution action
through use of the FTCA and its discretionary function exception.
The FTCA subjects the government and its employees to liability
similar to that of an individual acting in like circumstances. 20 3
Nevertheless, this waiver of sovereign immunity is not absolute,
as Congress specified certain circumstances in which sovereign
immunity would not shield the government.2 0 4 Under the discre-
tionary function exception, the waiver of sovereign immunity
shall not apply to:
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation
be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern-
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 2 5
This provision provides absolute immunity, regardless of whether
the government employee abused his discretion.20 6
201. See, e.g., Stencel v. Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
202. See id.
203. 28 U.S.C. 5 2674 (1988).
204. Id. S 2680.
205. Id.
206. See id. S 2680(a); see, e.g., Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577, 1581
(11th Cir. 1989); Dube v. Pittsburgh Corning, 870 F.2d 790, 798 (1st Cir. 1989); Golden
Pacific Bancorp v. Clarke, 837 F.2d 509, 511 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 890 (1988);
C.P. Chem. Co. v. United States, 810 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1987).
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The only salvation for the contractor's wallet is the argument
that the government's specifications regarding orders and designs
of operation plans that it knows may result in environmental
torts do not trigger the discretionary function exception. This
situation does not trigger this exception because the government
employee or agency does not have the discretion to order the
contractor to violate federal environmental law.207
Discretionary Function Exception
To determine whether the discretionary function exception
bars a suit against the government, the reviewing court must
examine the nature of the challenged conduct, rather than the
status of the actor. 208 The court should not view the conduct as
discretionary if it does not involve an element of judgment or
choice.20 9 Justice Marshall explained in the majority opinion of
Berkovitz v. United States210 that "the discretionary function ex-
ception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy
specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to
follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful option but to
adhere to the directive.1211
Federal environmental statutes and regulations apply equally
to the federal government and to private citizens and industries
due to the high priority Congress has placed on a clean environ-
ment.212 These statutes and regulations specifically explain which
actions agencies must take at federal facilities, as well as which
actions are prohibited, to ensure protection of the environment
and human welfare. Congress has expressed its intention to hold
all offenders accountable for environmental harm by mandating
broad application of these laws. Neither government agencies
nor employees can escape the duties that these laws set forth, 213
207. To the contrary, many federal environmental statutes contain provisions requiring
federal facility compliance. See, e.g., Clean Water Act (Title XIV) S 313, 33 U.S.C. S 1323
(1988); Public Health Service Act S 1447, 42 U.S.C. 300j-6 (1988); Solid Waste Disposal
Act § 6001, 42 U.S.C. S 6961; Clean Air Act § 118, 42 U.S.C. 7418; Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 S 120, 42 U.S.C. S 9620.
In special circumstances, however, the President may waive compliance. See Donnelly &
Van Ness, supra note 140.
208. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
209. Id.
210. 486 U.S. 531.
211. Id. at 536.
212. See supra note 207.
213. Id.
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and therefore no discretion in judgment is involved in actions
that trigger the application of these statutes and regulations.
The government has placed upon itself the absolute duty to obey.
Even if the challenged conduct involves an element of judg-
ment, a court still must determine "whether that judgment is of
the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed
to shield.."214 In creating the discretionary function exception,
Congress intended to "prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of leg-
islative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic,
and political policy through the medium of an action in tort. '215
The exception's protection is therefore limited to governmental
actions and decisions based on consideration of public policy. The
primary question in an action in which the government raises
the discretionary function exception and shows the existence of
an element of judgment is whether the government can charac-
terize the challenged judgment as a "permissible exercise of
policy judgment.."216
Clearly, Congress has expressed its intention that the federal
government must obey environmental laws. This expression re-
moved the policy judgment from any agency or official. Because
Congress made this policy decision, the government will fail in
its efforts to bar an indemnification/contribution action by claim-
ing that the government employee's challenged action was dis-
cretionary and hence protected under the FTCA. If the
government contractor cannot convince the court to extend the
government contractor defense into the environmental tort set-
ting or persuade Congress to either change existing environmen-
tal laws or legislate a form of the defense, an indemnification/
contribution action against the government may be the contrac-
tor's only realistic recourse for recovery of unjust damage awards
for wrongful acts for which it is not responsible. 217
CONCLUSION
In Crawford v. National Lead Co., 218 the district court recog-
nized that the government contractor may use the government
214. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
215. Id. at 536-37 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)).
216. Id. at 539.
217. Even if the contractor succeeds in obtaining indemnification or contribution from
the government, the FTCA may limit this recovery. See 28 U.S.C. S 2674 (1988) (The
United States is not "liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." If
the Court awards only punitive damages, the United States "shall be liable for actual or
compensatory damages.").
218. 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1048 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
[Vol. 32:399
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
contractor defense to shield itself from state tort liability in an
environmental tort setting.219 Unfortunately, courts have not pro-
vided any guidelines concerning how a contractor can take ad-
vantage of the defense in this setting.
At present, the threshold requirement described in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp.22 seems impossible for the government
contractor to overcome in an environmental tort setting due to
the construction of the majority of federal environmental laws,
which generally include an antipreemptive provision. Simply
stated, to extend the defense into a new setting, the contractor
must show that federal law preempts state law. Proving preemp-
tion places a heavy burden on the contractor because of the
strong presumption against preemption. Even though a contrac-
tor may advance some arguments through creative interpretation
of recent Supreme Court decisions concerning preemption, these
arguments have a slim chance.at success.
To overcome the adverse evolution of legal analysis in the
government contractor defense area, courts should consider and
weigh heavily the policy considerations that fueled the creation
of the defense. General fairness in the allocation of tort liability,
cost concerns to the taxpayers, and the separation of powers
doctrine should prompt the judiciary to fashion a less stringent
threshold requirement in the environmental tort setting to ensure
that the government contractor does not suffer injustice for its
diligent obedience to the controlling government officials.
Realistically, the contractor should focus its energy away from
arguing for judicial extension of the government contractor de-
fense and towards other alternatives that will accomplish the
same objectives. These alternatives may take the form of lob-
bying for legislative creation of the defense or abolition of stat-
utory obstacles to judicial extension. Additionally, the contractor
may seek indemnification provisions during contract negotiations
or may forego any preventative measures and risk the chance of
litigation against the government for judgments incurred during
the period of the contract. Whatever alternative the contractor
chooses, its chances of avoiding any costs are slim.
R. Joel Ankney
219. Id. at 1053-54.
220. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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